Following the recent fighting with the Mahdi Army, Slate’s Fred Kaplan wonders:

Are the Iranians extraordinarily clever, or are we extraordinarily dim? Certainly, when it comes to pursuing our respective interests in Iraq, they seem to be thinking and acting strategically, while we seem not to be.

Individually, I don’t disagree with any of Kaplan’s points. I too dispute the Administration’s framing of the fighting as a cut-and-dry battle between government forces and an Iranian-battled militia - everything I’ve read supports Kaplan’s assertion that, “the Badr Organization’s ties to Iran are not merely as close as Sadr’s; they are much closer.” And his interpretation of Iran’s goals and tactics is plausible, although there are so many analyses of Iran floating around that it seems like we have a lot more speculation than knowledge.

But the overall thrust of his argument - that we have made another strategic blunder, while the Iranians have scored a victory - understates the extent of our success on a tactical level, misunderstands where this tactical victory fits into our larger strategy, and overestimates the likelihood of Iran benefiting from the fighting.

On the tactical level, this was truly a victory for the United States. Although many Americans view the recent battle against Sadr as a failure, the reality on the ground is very different. The public has, understandably, become very skeptical about reports of progress over the past 5 years - “Mission Accomplished” still looms large. Primed to see the worst, the public immediately accepted the overly negative early press reports, and that first impression has persisted.

But recent press reports show just how much the terrain has shifted to our advantage:

• “Iraqi soldiers took control of the last bastions of the cleric Moktada al-Sadr’s militia in Basra on Saturday.” (New York Times)
• On April 20: “In a long statement read from the loudspeakers of his Sadr City Mosque, he threatened to declare ‘war until liberation’ against the government if fighting against his militia forces continued.” (New York Times)

  On April 26: “Anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his millions of followers Friday to continue observing a fragile cease-fire and not attack Iraqi troops, a move apparently designed to stave off a bloody confrontation with the government.” (Washington Post)

• “[F]or the first time in four years residents and tribesmen feel brave enough to turn against the militants. Many have handed in weapons in return for cash or point out where stockpiles of bombs and rockets are hidden.” (Times of London)
• “Young women are daring to wear jeans, soldiers listen to pop music on their mobile phones and bands are performing at wedding parties again.All across Iraq’s second city life is improving, a month after Iraqi troops began a surprise crackdown on the black-clad gangs who were allowed to flourish under the British military. The gunmen’s reign had enforced a strict set of religious codes.” (Times of London)
• “Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Thursday that the return of a Sunni political bloc that walked away from the government last year is imminent. The announcement followed a military campaign against Shiite militias that has buoyed Sunni politicians.” (Washington Post)

The outlines of a significant tactical victory are becoming clear. Does that fit into our strategic goals in Iraq? In chronological order, you can define our goals as:

• The reduction of violence
• Political reconciliation
• The establishment of rule-of-law
• The establishment of a federal democracy
• The drawdown of American forces to allow our Armed Services to be restored and re-aligned with different geopolitical goals.

Clearly, defeating Sadr has aided the first two goals, and may aid the third as well. First, the Sadr militia has been responsible for a great amount of violence, both inter- and intra-denominational, both against Iraqis and against Americans, so diminishing their capacity prevents violence.

Second, the attack on Sadr was endorsed and encouraged by both the Sunni and Kurdish political parties:

Iraq’s major Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish parties have closed ranks to force anti-American cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to disband his Mahdi Army militia or leave politics, lawmakers and officials involved in the effort said Sunday. (AP)

The fact that the Sunni bloc is now willing to rejoin the Parliament as a result of the fighting against Sadr is a significant marker on the path to political reconciliation.

Whether the battle on Sadr aids the establishment of rule of law will take more time to determine. As Kevin Drum wisely noted, “As long they don’t have to disarm, everyone in Iraq is in favor of the other guys disarming.” Nevertheless, even if it’s banal and obvious, it is still true that that 5 militias is closer to a single authority than 6, and Iraqi army control of Basra is superior to endless militia turf battles within Basra.

So we have a tactical victory for the United States that furthers our strategic goals. Clearly not the glaring defeat for us that Kaplan imagines. But is he correct that this is also a victory for Iran?

Kaplan argues that Iran is using ISCI to create a Shiite superstate in Southern Iraq, which will in turn “give them the best chance to influence and possibly control the southern territories, Iraq’s Shiite politics, and, therefore—by dint of the country’s Shiite majority—Iraqi politics generally.” This is a common argument; Larry Diamond, for example, has also said that, “ISCI”s political triumph in Iraq would bring a strategic bonanza to Iran - effective control of at least the southern half of Iraq.”

But the possibility of Iran actually gaining such control is far more remote than either Kaplan or Diamond allow. As the International Crisis Group explains, ISCI is not exactly well-respected by most Iraqis:

If SCIRI/ISCI has so far failed in achieving respectability, it is because it has never quite managed to shake off its past as an Iran-bred group of exiles with a narrow sectarian agenda enforced by a potent militia.

Those aren’t the only problems for ISCI implementing its Shiite super-region:

Hakim’s calls for the establishment of a Shiite super region in the nine southern governorates have provoked widespread opposition, including among fellow Shiites. Equally suspect to many Iraqis has been the party’s more recent cosy relationship with the U.S. As a result, SCIRI/ISCI enjoys little popularity. Moreover, the party faces a possible succession crisis, as a gravely ill Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim gradually fades from the scene, with his son Ammar perhaps too young and inexperienced to replace him.

By defeating Sadr, America has reduced an opponent and helped further political reconciliation. Although still far from overall success in Iraq, the defeat of Sadr should be taken at face value - as the victory it is.

This entry was posted on Saturday, April 26th, 2008 at 8:18 pm and is filed under Iraq. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.